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Abstract
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names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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TA diaspora bond is a debt instrument issued by a 
country – or potentially, a sub-sovereign entity or a 
private corporation – to raise financing from its overseas 
diaspora. Israel and India have raised $35-40 billion using 
these bonds. Drawing on their experiences, this paper 
discusses the rationale, methodology, and factors affecting 
the issuance of diaspora bonds for raising external 
development finance. The Government of Israel has 
offered a flexible menu of diaspora bonds since 1951 to 
keep the Jewish diaspora engaged. The Indian authorities, 
in contrast, have used this instrument for balance of 
payments support, to raise financing during times when 
they had difficulty in accessing international capital 
markets. Diaspora bonds are often sold at a premium 
to the diaspora members, thus fetching a “patriotic” 
discount in borrowing costs. Besides patriotism or the 
desire to do good in the investor’s country of origin, 
This paper—a product of the Migration and Remittances Team of the Development Prospects Group—is part of a larger 
effort in the department to analyze policy tools that developing countries can utilize for mobilizing resources from their 
diasporas. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at dratha@worldbank.org.  
such a discount can also be explained by the fact that 
diaspora investors may be more willing and able to take 
on sovereign risks of default in hard currency as well as 
devaluation as they may have local currency liabilities and 
they may be able to influence the borrower’s decision to 
service such debt.
   The paper discusses several conditions for successful 
diaspora bond issuance having a sizeable diaspora, 
especially first-generation migrants, is understandably 
an important factor affecting the issuance of diaspora 
bonds. Countries with strong and transparent legal 
systems for contract enforcement are likely to find it 
easier to issue such bonds. Absence of civil strife is a plus. 
While not a pre-requisite, presence of national banks and 
other institutions in destination countries facilitates the 
marketing of bonds to the diaspora.  
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I. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we examine the Israeli and Indian track records to draw generalized 
conclusions about the viability of diaspora bonds as a development financing instrument. 
The rise of various diasporas and their economic status in their adopted countries are fast 
becoming a source of pride as well as financial resources for developing countries. If 
seeking remittances is a way of tapping into diaspora income flows on a regular basis,
1 
issuance of hard-currency-denominated bonds to the diaspora is a way of tapping into the 
latter’s wealth accumulated abroad.  
Diaspora bonds are not yet widely used as a development financing instrument. 
As discussed below, Israel since 1951 and India since 1991 have been on the forefront in 
raising hard-currency financing from their respective diaspora. Bonds issued by the 
Development Corporation for Israel (DCI), established in 1951 to raise foreign exchange 
resources from the Jewish Diaspora, have totaled well over $25 billion. Diaspora bonds 
issued by the government-owned State Bank of India (SBI) have raised over $11 billion 
to date. The Government of Sri Lanka has also sold Sri Lanka Development Bonds 
(SLDBs) since 2001 to several investor categories including non-resident Sri Lankans 
raising a total of $580 million to date.
2 South Africa is reported to have launched a 
project to issue Reconciliation and Development (R&D) bonds to both expatriate and 
domestic investors (Bradlow 2006). Although the Lebanese government has had no 
systematic program to tap its diaspora, anecdotal evidence indicates that the Lebanese 
diaspora has also contributed capital to the Lebanese government.
3
Diaspora bonds are different from foreign currency deposits (FCDs) that are used 
by many developing countries to attract foreign currency inflows.
4 Diaspora bonds are 
                                                 
1 Remittance flows to developing countries have increased steadily and sharply in recent years to reach over 
$200 billion in 2006 (Ratha 2007). The World Bank believes that unrecorded remittance flows to 
developing countries are one-half as large (World Bank 2005).   
2 As per the Central Bank of Sri Lanka press release of September 13, 2006, the last issue of SLDBs for 
$105 million was sold through competitive bidding on September 12, 2006 at an average yield of 
LIBOR+148.5 basis points.  
3 Indirect evidence may be that the Lebanon’s government bonds are priced higher than the level consistent 
with the country’s sovereign credit rating. 
4 A Bloomberg search of FCD schemes identifies well over 30 developing countries. Moody’s and 
Standard and Poor’s have foreign currency short-term debt ratings for 60 and 68 developing countries 
respectively.  
  2typically long-dated securities to be redeemed only upon maturity. FCDs, in contrast, can 
be withdrawn at any time. This is certainly true of demand and saving deposits. But even 
time deposits can be withdrawn at any time by forgoing a portion of accrued interest. 
Therefore, FCDs are likely to be much more volatile, requiring banks to hold much larger 
reserves against their FCD liabilities, thereby reducing their ability to fund investments. 
Diaspora bonds, in contrast, are a source of foreign financing that is long-term in nature. 
Hence, the proceeds from such bonds can be used to finance investment.   
Diaspora bonds may appear somewhat similar to the Islamic bonds. But unlike 
diaspora bonds, Islamic bonds are governed by Islamic laws (Sharia) that forbid paying 
or receiving interest, and are structured as asset-backed securities of medium-term 
maturity that give investors a share of the profit associated with proceeds from such 
issuance. The international Islamic bond market is divided into sovereign (and quasi-
sovereign) and corporate Sukuk markets. The Bahrain Monetary Agency was the first 
central bank to issue Islamic bonds with three and five year maturities in 2001. The 
German State of Saxony-Anhalt was the first non-Muslim issuer of Sukuk bonds when it 
tapped the global Islamic debt market in 2004 for EUR100 million. Qatar Global Sukuk 
for $700 million has been the largest issue of Islamic bonds to date with a seven-year 
maturity. Two factors have contributed to the recent rapid rise in Islamic bond issuance: 
growing demand for Sharia-compliant financial instruments from Muslim immigrant and 
non-immigrants population around the world, and the growing oil wealth in the Gulf 
region (El Qorchi 2005).   
The diaspora purchases of bonds issued by their country of origin are likely to be 
driven by a sense of patriotism and the desire to contribute to the development of the 
home country. Thus, there is often an element of charity in these investments. The 
placement of bonds at a premium allows the issuing country to leverage the charity 
element into a substantially larger flow of capital. To the investors, diaspora bonds 
provide opportunity to diversify asset composition and improve risk management. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next two sections, we examine the 
experiences of diaspora bond issuance by Israel and India. In Section IV, we elaborate 
why diaspora bonds are attractive to the issuers and the investors. In Section V, we 
  3discuss minimum conditions for the issuance of diaspora bonds, and identify several 
potential issuers. We conclude in Section VI with a summary of findings and discussion 
of future research.  
 
 
II. Israeli Experience 
The Jewish diaspora in the United States (and to a lesser extent Canada) has 
supported development of Israel by buying bonds issued by the Development 
Corporation for Israel (DCI). The DCI was established in 1951 with the express objective 
of raising foreign exchange for the state from Jewish diaspora abroad (as individuals and 
communities) through issuance of non-negotiable bonds. Israel views this financial 
vehicle as a stable source of overseas borrowing as well as an important mechanism for 
maintaining ties with diaspora Jewry. Nurturing of such ties is considered crucial as 
reflected in the fact that the DCI offerings of diaspora bonds are quite extensive with 
multiple maturities and minimum subscription amounts that range from a low of $100 to 
a high of $100,000. The diaspora is also valued as a diversified borrowing source, 
especially during periods when the government has difficulty in borrowing from other 
external sources. Opportunity for redemption of these bonds has been limited and history 
shows that nearly all DCI bonds are redeemed only at maturity. Furthermore, some $200 
million in maturing bonds were never claimed.
5
The Israeli Knesset passed a law in February 1951 authorizing the floatation of 
the country’s first diaspora bond issue known as the Israel Independence Issue, thereby 
marking the beginning of a program that has raised over $25 billion since inception 
(Figure 1). In May 1951, David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, officially 
kicked off the Israeli diaspora bond sales drive in the United States with a rally in New 
York and then undertook a coast-to-coast tour to build support for it. This first road show 
was highly successful and raised $52.6 million in bond sales. The DCI bonds make up 
roughly 32 percent of the government’s outstanding external debt of $31.4 billion as of 
end-December 2005. 
                                                 
5 Chander, Anupam “Diaspora Bonds and US Securities Regulation: An interview”, Business Law Journal, 
University of California, Davis, School of Law, May 1, 2005. 
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The history of DCI bond issuance reveals that the characteristics of such bond 
offerings have changed with time. Until the early 1970s, all DCI issues were fixed-rate 
bonds with maturities of 10 to 15 years (Table 1). In the mid-1970s, DCI decided to 
target small banks and financial companies in the United States by issuing 10, 7 and 5 
year notes in denominations of $150,000, $250,000 and $1,000,000 at prime-based rates. 
Subsequently, the DCI changed its policy and began to re-target Jewish communities 
rather than banks and financial companies. The DCI also sold floating rate bonds from 
1980 to 1999. The minimum amount on floating rate bonds was set at $25,000 in 1980 
and reduced to $5,000 in December 1986. The maturity terms on these bonds were set at 
10 to 12 years and interest rate was calculated on the basis of the prime rate. Of the total 
DCI bond sales of $1.6 billion in 2003, fixed rate bonds comprised 89.5 percent, floating 
rate bonds 2.9 percent and notes 7.6 percent (Figure 2). 
 
 
Table 1: Bond Offerings in Israel 
 
Bond Type  Dates  Maturity  Minimum  Rate Basis 
Fixed rate  1951-80  10-15 yrs  N/A  4.0 
Fixed rate  1990 on  10 yrs  N/A  Mkt. based 
Fixed rate – EDI  1993  10 yrs  $25,000  Mkt. based, 6-month 
Fixed rate -- Zero Coupon  1993  10yrs  $6,000  Mkt based, at redemption  
Fixed rate – Jubilee  1998  5-10 yrs  $25,000  Mkt. based, 6-month 
  5        
Notes   Mid-1970s  10 yrs  $150,000  Prime based 
   7  yrs  $250,000   
   5  yrs  $1,000,000   
        
Floating rate  1980-1992  10-12 yrs  $25,0000, $5,000  Prime based 
Floating rate  1993-99  10 yrs  $5,000  Prime based 
Floating rate  Since End 1999  10 yrs  N/A  Libor based 
Source:  Bank of Israel 
 





























































































































Source: Bank of Israel 
 
Currently, Israel uses proceeds from bond sales to diaspora Jewry to finance 
major public sector projects such as desalination, construction of housing, and 
communication infrastructure. The Ministry of Finance defines DCI’s annual borrowing 
policy in accordance with the government’s foreign exchange requirements. The Finance 
Ministry periodically sets interest rates and more recently other parameters on different 
types of DCI bonds to meet the annual borrowing target. Still, the Israeli government 
does not consider borrowings from diaspora Jewry as a market-based source of finance. 
Accordingly, it does not seek credit ratings on these bonds from rating agencies such as 
S&P and Moody’s.  
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Source: Bank of Israel and U.S. Federal Reserve 
 
Comparison of interest rates on fixed-rate DCI bonds versus those on 10-year 
UST notes shows the large extent of discount offered by the Jewish diaspora in 
purchasing these bonds. Interest rates on DCI fixed-rate bonds averaged about 4 percent 
from 1951 to 1989. While the 10-year UST rates were lower than 4 percent only from 
1951 to 1958, they have been higher than 4 percent since. Of course, as the UST rates 
kept on rising rapidly in the 1980s and buying DCI bonds at 4 percent implied steep 
discounts, demand for the fixed-rate issues waned in favor of floating rate debt (Figures 2 
and 3).  The sharp decline in US rates since 2002 has, however, re-kindled investor 
interest in fixed-rate DCI bonds. Note that the degree of patriotic discount has dwindled 
in recent years and rates on fixed-rate DCI bonds have exceeded 10-year UST yields. 
This is perhaps owed to the fact that younger Jewish investors are seeking market-based 
returns. But perhaps more importantly, the decline in patriotic discount is also due to the 
Ministry of Finance developing alternative sources of external financing such as 
negotiable bonds guaranteed by the U.S. government, non-guaranteed negotiable bonds 
and loans from banks. These instruments, which trade in the secondary market, provide 
alternative avenues for acquiring exposure to Israel. Consequently, interest rates on DCI 
bonds have to be competitive; in fact a tad higher than those on the above alternative 
instruments given that DCI bonds are non-negotiable (Rehavi and Asher 2004).  
  7The 50 plus year history of DCI bond issuance reveals that the Israeli government 
has nurtured this stable source of external finance that has often provided it foreign 
exchange resources at a discount to the market price. Over the years, the government has 
expanded the range of instruments available to Jewish diaspora investors. The pricing of 
these bonds has also recognized the changing nature of the target investor population. In 
the early years, the DCI sold bonds to diaspora Jewry, principally in the United States, 
having a direct or indirect connection with the Holocaust and hence willing to buy Israeli 
bonds at deep discount to market. But the old generation is being replaced by a new, 
whose focus is increasingly on financial returns. Accordingly, the DCI bond offerings 
have had to move in recent years towards market pricing.  
No commercial/investment banks or brokers have been involved in the marketing 
of Israeli diaspora bonds. Instead, these bonds are sold directly by DCI with Bank of New 
York acting as the fiscal agent. Currently, there are about 200 DCI employees in the 
United States who maintain close contacts with Jewish communities in the various 
regions of the country so as to understand investor profiles and preferences. They host 
investor events in Jewish communities with the express purpose of maintaining ties and 
selling bonds.   
III. Indian Experience 
The Indian government has tapped its diaspora base of non-resident Indians 
(NRIs) for funding on three separate occasions – India Development Bonds (IDBs) 
following the balance of payments crisis in 1991 ($1.6 billion), Resurgent India Bonds 
(RIBs) following the imposition of sanctions in the wake of the nuclear explosions in 
1998 ($4.2 billion), and India Millennium Deposits (IMDs) in 2000 ($5.5 billion). The 
conduit for these transactions was the government-owned State Bank of India (SBI).  The 
IDBs provided a vehicle to NRIs to bring back funds that they had withdrawn earlier that 
year as the country experienced a balance of payments crisis.  The IDBs and 
subsequently the RIBs and IMDs paid retail investors a higher return than they would 
have received from similar financial instruments in their country of residence.  India also 
benefited because the diaspora investors did not seek as high a country risk premium as 
markets would have demanded.  While this may have reflected different assessments of 
  8default probabilities, a more plausible explanation resides in investors of Indian origin 
viewing the risk of default with much less trepidation.
6   
Table 2: Diaspora Bonds Issued by India 
Bond Type  Amount  Year  Maturity  Minimum  Coupon 
 
India Development Bond 
    USD 
    GBP 
  
Resurgent India Bond 
    USD 
    GBP 
    DM 
 
 
India Millennium Deposits 
    USD 
    GBP 



































































* plus multiples of 1,000; ** plus multiples of 500 
Source: State Bank of India 
The IDBs, RIBs and IMDs all had five-year bullet maturity. The issues were done 
in multiple currencies – US dollar, British pound, Deutsche mark/euro. Other relevant 
characteristics of the offerings are set out in Table 2. Unlike the Jewish diaspora, the 
Indian diaspora provided no patriotic discount on RIBs and only a small one on IMDs. 
When RIBs were sold in August 1998 to yield 7.75 percent on U.S. dollar-denominated 
bonds, the yield on BB-rated U.S. corporate bonds was 7.2 percent. There was thus no 
discount on the RIBs. As for the IMDs, the coupon was 8.5 percent while the yield on the 
comparably rated U.S. corporate bonds was 8.9 percent for a 40 basis points discount. In 
any case, Indian diaspora bonds provided much smaller discounts in comparison to 
Israel’s DCI bonds. 
From a purely economic perspective, the SBI’s decision to restrict access to RIBs 
and IMDs to investors of Indian origin appears a bit odd. Why limit the potential size of 
the market? First, restricting the RIB and IMD sales to the Indian diaspora may have been 
a marketing strategy introduced in the belief that Indian investors would be more eager to 
                                                 
6   We take up this point again in explaining SBI’s decision to restrict the access to RIBs and IMDs to 
investors of Indian origin. 
  9invest in instrument that are available exclusively to them. Second, the SBI perhaps 
believed that the Indian diaspora investors would show more understanding and 
forbearance than other investors if India encountered a financial crisis. Having local 
currency denominated current and/or contingent liabilities, the Indian diaspora investors 
might be content to receive debt service in rupees.  In addition to the above reasons, 
however, the KYC (know-your-customer) reason offered to us by SBI officials appears 
convincing. The SBI concluded that it knew its Indian diaspora investor base well enough 
to feel comfortable that the invested funds did not involve drug money.   
Table 3: Comparison of Diaspora Bonds Issued by Israel and India 
Israel India
Annual  issuance since 1951  Opportunistic issuance in 1991, 1998 and 
2000 
Development oriented borrowings   Balance of payments support 
Large though declining patriotic discount  Small patriotic discount, if any 
Fixed, floating rate bonds and notes   Fixed rate bonds 
Maturities from 1 to 20 years with bullet 
repayment 
Five year with bullet maturity 
Direct distribution by DCI  SBI distribution in conjunction with int'l 
banks 
Targeted towards but not limited to 
diaspora  
Limited to diaspora 
SEC registered  No SEC registration  
Non-negotiable Non-negotiable 
India’s diaspora bonds differ from Israel’s in several ways (Table 3). First, Israel 
views diaspora Jewry as a permanent fountain of external capital, which the DCI has kept 
engaged by offering a variety of investment vehicles on terms that the market demanded 
over the years. India, however, has used the diaspora funding only opportunistically. 
 Second, the SBI has restricted the sales of its diaspora bonds only to investors of 
Indian origin. Israel, in contrast, has not limited the access to only the diaspora Jewry. 
  10Finally, while the DCI has registered its offerings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), the SBI has opted out of SEC registration.  
 
The question of SEC registration 
As Chander (2001) points out, the SBI decision to forego SEC registration of 
RIBs and IMDs raises several interesting issues. As for the RIBs, India managed to sell 
them to Indian diaspora retail investors in the United States without registering the 
instrument with the SEC. It made the argument that RIBs were bank certificates of 
deposits (CDs) and hence came under the purview of U.S. banking rather than U.S. 
securities laws. Indeed, the offer document described the RIBs as “bank instruments 
representing foreign currency denominated deposits in India.” Like time CDs, the RIBs 
were to pay the original deposit plus interest at maturity. RIBs were also distributed 
through commercial banks; there were no underwriters. While the SEC did not quite 
subscribe to the Indian position, the SBI still sold RIBs to US-based retail investors of 
Indian origin. But it was unable to do so when it came to the IMDs, which were explicitly 
called deposits. Still, the SBI chose to forego U.S. SEC registration. Instead of taking on 
the SEC, the SBI placed IMDs with Indian diaspora in Europe, the Gulf States and the 
Far East.  
Generally, high costs, stringent disclosure requirements and lengthy lead times are 
cited as the principal deterrents to SEC registration. But these were probably not 
insurmountable obstacles. Costs of registration could not have exceeded $500,000; an 
insignificant amount compared to large size of the issue and the massive size of the U.S. 
investor base of Indian origin to which the registration would provide unfettered access. 
The disclosure requirements also should not have been a major constraint for an 
institution like the SBI, which was already operating in a stringent regulatory Indian 
banking environment. The relatively long lead-time of up to three months was an issue 
and weighed on the minds of SBI officials, especially when RIBs were issued in the wake 
of the nuclear explosions and sanctions. But SBI officials pointed to the plaintiff-friendly 
U.S. court system in relation to other jurisdictions as the principal reason for eschewing 
SEC registration. As Roberta Romano explains “in addition to class action mechanisms 
  11to aggregate individual claims not prevalent in other countries, U.S. procedure – 
including rules of discovery, pleading requirements, contingent fees, and the absence of a 
‘loser pays’ cost rule – are far more favorable to plaintiffs than those of foreign courts.” 
(Romano 1998) Finally, high priced lawyers also make litigation in the United States 
quite expensive. A combination of these attributes poses a formidable risk to issuers 
bringing offerings to the U.S. market (Chander 2001).  
India’s decision to forego SEC registration implied the avoidance of both U.S. 
laws and U.S. court procedures. Chander (2001) presents four reasons why an issuer 
involved in a global offering might seek to avoid multiple jurisdictions. First, compliance 
with the requirements of multiple jurisdictions is likely to escalate costs quite sharply. 
Second, the substantive features of the law may be unfavorable or especially demanding 
for particular types of issuers or issues. Countries, for example, have differing definitions 
of what constitute securities. Third, compliance with the requirements of multiple 
jurisdictions can delay offerings because of time involved in making regulatory filing and 
obtaining regulatory approvals. While the pre-filing disclosure requirements under 
Schedule B of the Securities Act in the United States are very limited, a market practice 
has developed to provide a lot of detailed economic and statistical information about the 
country, possibly to avoid material omissions. Putting together such information for the 
first time can prove daunting. Finally, the application of multiple regulatory systems to a 
global offering can potentially subject the issuer to law suits in multiple jurisdictions. 
Perhaps an argument can be made, as in Chander (2001), that investors be 
allowed to divest themselves from U.S. securities law in their international investments if 
they so choose. This approach could be generalized by giving investors the choice-of-law 
and forum, which is a principle recognized by U.S. courts for international transactions. 
The law and forum would then become another attribute of the security, which will 
influence its market price. Giving investors the choice-of-law and forum can be 
supported on efficiency grounds provided that rational and well-informed investors 
populate the market. Proposals giving such a choice to investors were floated towards the 
end of the 1990s (Romano 1998, Choi an Guzman 1998). But markets were roiled since 
then by the collapse of Enron and MCI, signaling that markets were not always working 
in the best interest of investors. In view of this, it is highly unlikely that the SEC or the 
  12Congress would in the near future relax regulations and permit international investors to 
opt out of U.S. laws and courts (Chander 2005).  
Nonetheless, an eventual shift towards a more permissive environment may occur 
as more and more investors vote with their feet and adopt laws and courts of a country 
other than the United States. This is already happening. Of the 25 largest stock offerings 
(IPOs) in 2005, only one was made in the United States (Zakaria, 2006). Furthermore, 
nine of 10 IPOs in 2006 were also done in overseas markets. Indeed, a new effort has 
been launched in New York to recommend changes to the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
other laws and regulations that are believed to hinder the competitiveness of U.S. capital 
markets.
7 Chinese companies often cite the latter as the principal concern that leads them 
to issue stocks outside the United States. (Murray 2006). In the short term, however, 
countries wishing to raise capital from diaspora investors will have to register their 
offerings with the U.S. SEC if they wish to have access to the retail U.S. diaspora 
investor base. If they opt to eschew SEC registration, they will then lose their ability to 
sell in the retail U.S. market. 
IV. Rationale for Diaspora Bonds  
Rationale for the issuer 
Countries are expected to find diaspora bonds an attractive vehicle for securing a 
stable and cheap source of external finance. Since patriotism is the principal motivation 
for purchasing diaspora bonds, they are likely to be in demand in fair as well as foul 
weather.
8 Also, the diaspora is expected to provide a “patriotic” discount in pricing these 
bonds. The Israeli and to a lesser extent the Indian experience is clearly in keeping with 
this hypothesis.  
                                                 
7 The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation is an independent and bipartisan group comprised of 23 
leaders from the investor community, business, finance, law, accounting, and academia. On November 30, 
2006, the Committee issued its interim report, highlighting areas of concern about the competitiveness of 
U.S. capital markets and outlining 32 recommendations in four key areas to enhance that competitiveness. 
For more information on this high-powered committee see www.capmktsreg.org. 
8 Indeed, the purchases of bonds issued by Israel’s DCI rose during the six-day war. Similarly, India was 
able to raise funds from its diaspora in the wake of the foreign exchange crisis in 1991 and again following 
the nuclear explosion in 1998 when the country faced debilitating sanctions from the international 
community. 
  13The patriotic discount, which is tantamount to charity, raises an interesting 
question as to why a country should not seek just charitable contributions from their 
diaspora instead of taking on debt associated with the diaspora bonds. Seeking handouts 
may be considered politically degrading in some countries. More importantly, diaspora 
bonds allow a country to leverage a small amount of charity into a large amount of 
resources for development. 
Yet another factor that might play into the calculus of the diaspora bond-issuing 
nation is the favorable impact it would have on the country’s sovereign credit rating. By 
making available a reliable source of funding that can be availed in good as well as bad 
times, the nurturing of the diaspora bond market improves a country’s sovereign credit 
rating. Rating agencies believe that Israel’s ability to access the worldwide Jewry for 
funding has undoubtedly supported its sovereign credit rating. But S&P does not view 
this source of funding as decisive in determining Israel’s credit rating. S&P cites Israel’s 
inability to escape painful adjustment program in the 1980s in reaching this conclusion. 
In other words, the availability of financing from the Jewish diaspora did not allow Israel 
to avoid a crisis rooted in domestic mismanagement. While the Jewish diaspora investors 
have stood by Israel whenever the country has come under attack from outside, they have 
not been as supportive when the problems were homegrown.  
While concurring with the above assessment, Moody’s analysts also point out that 
the mid-1980’s economic adjustment which brought down inflationary expectations and 
the 2002/03 structural reforms have improved Israel’s economic fundamentals such that 
the country has sharply reduced its dependence on foreign financing. Furthermore, 
diaspora bonds and the U.S. government guaranteed debt make up the bulk of Israel’s 
total external indebtedness; market-based debt is only about 13 percent of total public-
sector foreign debt at end-December 2005. As a result, Israel’s ability to issue diaspora 
bonds is now much more important in underpinning Israel’s sovereign credit rating than 
it was in the 1980’s when the country had much larger financing requirement.        
India’s access to funding from its diaspora did not prevent the rating agencies 
from downgrading the country’s sovereign credit rating in 1998 following the imposition 
of international sanctions in the wake of the nuclear explosions. Moody’s downgraded 
India from Baa3 to Ba2 in June 1998 and S&P cut the rating to BB from BB+ in October 
  141998. But the excellent reception which RIBs and IMDs received in difficult 
circumstances has raised the relevance of diaspora funding to India’s creditworthiness. 
Unlike Israel, however, India has not made diaspora bonds a regular feature of its foreign 
financing forays. Instead, diaspora bonds are used as a source of emergency finance. 
While not explicitly stated, India has tapped this funding source whenever the balance of 
payments has threatened to run into deficit. The country’s ability to do so is now 
perceived as a plus.  
Rationale for the investors 
Why would investors find diaspora bonds attractive? Patriotism explains in large 
part investors purchasing diaspora bonds. The discount from market price at which Israel, 
India and Lebanon have managed to sell such bonds to their respective diaspora is 
reflection of the charity implicit in these transactions. Up to the end of the 1980s, Israel’s 
DCI sold bonds with 10 to 15 year maturities to Jewish diaspora in the United States (and 
Canada to a lesser extent) at a fixed rate of roughly 4 percent without any reference to 
changes in U.S. interest rates. U.S. 10-year yields over the same time period averaged 6.8 
percent, implying a significant discount to market. It is only in the 1990s that interest 
rates paid by the DCI started to rise in the direction of market interest rates.  
Beyond patriotism, however, several other factors may also help explain diaspora 
interest in bonds issued by their country of origin. The principal among these is the 
opportunity such bonds provides for risk management. The worst-case default risk 
associated with diaspora bonds is that the issuing country would be unable to make debt 
service payments in hard currency. But its ability to pay interest and principal in local 
currency terms is perceived to be much stronger, and therein lies the attractiveness of 
such bonds to diaspora investors. Typically, diaspora investors have current or contingent 
liabilities in their home country and hence may not be averse to accumulating assets in 
local currency. Consequently, they view the risk of receiving debt service in local 
currency terms with much less trepidation than purely dollar-based investors. Similarly, 
they are also likely to be much less concerned about the risk of currency devaluation.  
The SBI officials we interviewed were quite explicit in stating that the Indian diaspora 
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obligations in rupees.      
Still other factors supporting purchases of diaspora bonds include the satisfaction 
that investors reap from contributing to economic growth in their home country. Diaspora 
bonds offer investors a vehicle to express their desire to do "good" in their country of 
origin through investment. Furthermore, diaspora bonds allow investors the opportunity 
to diversify their assets away from their adopted country. Finally and somewhat 
speculatively, diaspora investors may also believe that they have some influence on 
policies at home, especially on bond repayments. 
 
V. Conditions and Candidates for Successful Diaspora Bond Issuance  
The sizeable Jewish and Indian diasporas in the United States, Europe and 
elsewhere have contributed to the success of Israel and India in raising funds from their 
respective diaspora. Many members of these diaspora communities have moved beyond 
the initial struggles of immigrants to become quite affluent. In the United States, for 
example, Jewish and Indian communities earn among the highest levels of per capita 
incomes. In 2000, the median income of Indian-American and Jewish households in the 
United States was $60,093 and $54,000, respectively, versus $38,885 for all U.S. 
households.
9 Like all immigrants, they are also known to save more than the average 
U.S. savings rate. As a result, they have sizable amount of assets invested in stocks, 
bonds, real estate and bank deposits.  
Many other nations have large diaspora communities in the high-income OECD 
countries (Table 4).
10  The presence of tens of millions of Mexican nationals in the 
United States is quite well known. The Philippines, India, China, Vietnam and Korea 
from Asia; El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Colombia, Guatemala and Haiti 
from Latin America and the Caribbean; and Poland from Eastern Europe have significant 
diaspora presence in the United States. Diaspora presence is also significant in other parts 
of the world, e.g., Korean and Chinese diaspora in Japan; Indian and Pakistani diaspora in 
                                                 
9 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) of 2000/01 and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
10 Data on migration stocks tend to be incomplete and outdated. Recent efforts to collect bilateral migration 
data in major migration corridors are summarized in Ratha and Shaw (2007). 
  16the United Kingdom; Turkish, Croatian and Serbian diasporas in Germany; Algerians and 
Moroccans in France; and large pools of migrants from India, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Bangladesh, Indonesia and Africa in the oil-rich Gulf countries.  
Table 4: Countries with Large Diasporas in the High-income OECD Countries 






(% of population) 
Emigrant stock 




1 Philippines  1,126  1.49 2.22  -0.52 
2 India  1,038  0.10 0.17  0.09 
3 Mexico  923  0.94 6.56  -0.48 
4 China  817  0.06 0.13  -0.47 
5 Vietnam  506  0.64 1.61  -0.45 
6 Poland  449  1.16 2.94  0.32 
7 Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  309  0.48 0.83  -0.76 
8 Jamaica  291  11.24 26.30  -0.55 
9 Russian  Federation  289  0.20 0.39  -0.84 
10 Ukraine  246  0.50 1.51  -0.60 
11 Colombia  234  0.55 1.33  -0.71 
12 Pakistan  222  0.16 0.42  -0.81 
13 Romania  176  0.79 2.51  -0.29 
14 Turkey  174  0.26 2.92  0.07 
15 Brazil  168  0.10 0.22  -0.41 
16 South  Africa  168  0.38 0.61  0.19 
17 Peru  164  0.63 1.35  -0.77 
18 Dominican  Republic  155  1.88 7.08  -0.66 
19 Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  149  0.22 0.38  0.02 
20  Serbia and Montenegro  148  1.82 8.78  -0.81 
21 Morocco  141  0.51 3.93  -0.10 
22 Lebanon  138  4.07 9.15  -0.36 
23 El  Salvador  128  2.03 10.67  -0.37 
24 Hungary  124  1.22 3.12  0.70 
25 Trinidad  and  Tobago  120  9.37 18.35  -0.07 
   Cuba  333  2.99 7.76  -1.14 
   Haiti  153  1.92 4.93  -1.62 
   Nigeria  149  0.13 0.20  -1.38 
Source: Governance data from Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi; high-skilled migrants abroad in high-
income OECD countries as of 2000  from Docquier and Marfouk (2004). 
But for diaspora investors to purchase hard currency bonds issued by their 
countries of origin, it would seem that there has to be a minimum level governability. 
Absence of governability, as reflected in civil strife, is clearly a big negative for diaspora 
bonds. While this requirement would not disqualify most countries in the Far East and 
many in Eastern Europe, countries such as Cuba, Haiti and Nigeria (and several others in 
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found wanting. Israeli and Indian experience also shows that countries will have to 
register their diaspora bonds with the U.S. SEC if they want to tap the retail U.S. market. 
The customary disclosure requirements of SEC registration may prove daunting for some 
countries. Some of the African and East European countries and Turkey with significant 
diaspora presence in Europe, however, will be able to raise funds on the continent where 
the regulatory requirements are relatively less stringent than in the United States. 
Arguably, diaspora bonds could also be issued in the major destination countries in the 
Gulf region and in Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Russia and South Africa. 
The Israeli track record reveals how the patriotic discount is the greater from first 
generation diaspora than from subsequent generations. Thus, the DCI secured large 
elements of charity in bonds issued in the immediate wake of the birth of the nation. As 
the Jewish diaspora with intimate connection to the Holocaust dwindled over time, the 
DCI pricing of diaspora bonds moved closer to the market. This is likely to be even more 
important where the diaspora ties are based on country of origin rather than religion. The 
second and subsequent generation country diaspora can be expected to have much weaker 
ties to their ancestral countries. This suggests that more than the aggregate size of the 
diaspora, the strength of the first generation immigrants with close ties to the home 
country would be a better yardstick of the scope for diaspora bonds. Also skilled migrants 
are more likely to invest in diaspora bonds than unskilled migrants.       
While not a pre-requisite, the sale of diaspora bonds would be greatly facilitated if 
the issuing country’s institutions such as the DCI from Israel or its banks had a 
significant presence to service their diaspora in the developed countries of Europe and 
North America. Such institutions and bank networks would be much better positioned to 
market diaspora bonds to specific diaspora individuals/communities. Clearly, the 
presence of Indian banks in the United States helped marketing of RIBs. Where the 
Indian diaspora was known to favor specific foreign banks, such as the Citibank and 
HSBC in the Gulf region, the SBI out-sourced to them the marketing of RIBs and IMDs.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
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diaspora bonds as instruments for raising external development finance, mostly drawing 
on the experiences of Israel and India. The Government of Israel has nurtured this asset 
class by offering a flexible menu of investment options to keep the Jewish diaspora 
engaged since 1951. The Indian authorities, in contrast, have used this instrument 
opportunistically to raise financing during times when they had difficulty in accessing 
international capital markets (for example, in the aftermath of their nuclear testing in 
1998). While thus far, only state-owned entities have issued diaspora bonds, there is no 
reason why private sector companies cannot tap this source of funding. In terms of 
process, the issuers of diaspora bonds were able to bypass U.S. SEC registration in the 
past; but that may not happen in the near future as U.S. investors are unlikely to be 
allowed to choose the law and the forum governing bond contracts. Finally, factors that 
facilitate—or constrain—the issuance of diaspora bonds include having a sizeable and 
wealthy diaspora abroad, and a strong and transparent legal system for contract 
enforcement at home. Absence of civil strife is a plus. While not a pre-requisite, presence 
of national banks and other institutions in destination countries facilitates the marketing 
of bonds to the diaspora. 
It has been difficult to gather facts and data on diaspora bonds although 
anecdotally a number of countries are believed to have issued such bonds in the past (e.g., 
Greece after World War II). One difficulty that confounds data gathering is the confusion 
between diaspora bonds and foreign currency deposits, and sometimes between diaspora 
bonds and local currency deposits. Exhorting the diaspora members to deposit money in 
domestic banks is different from asking them to purchase foreign currency denominated 
bonds in international capital markets. Indeed, as we pointed out above, diaspora bonds 
are also different from Islamic bonds even though both are targeted to investors 
belonging to a specific group rather than to all investors. There is a need for better data 
gathering, including on pricing of these bonds, and on the cyclical characteristics of the 
flows associated with these bonds.  
There is also a need for clarity on regulations in the host countries that allow or 
constrain diaspora members from investing in these bonds. A pertinent question in this 
respect is, should these bonds be non-negotiable, or should we make an effort to develop 
  19a secondary market for these bonds? An argument can be made for the latter on the 
ground that tradability in the secondary market would improve liquidity and pricing of 
these bonds.  
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